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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-3152 
_____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
ALFONSO F. CARTER, 
Appellant 
 
Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 0314-1:1-99-cr-00099-001) 
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
Tuesday, January 24, 2012 
 
Before: McKEE, Chief Judge, FISHER, and GREENAWAY, Jr., Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion Filed: May 1, 2012) 
_____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
_____________ 
 
 
McKEE, Chief Judge. 
 
 Alfonso Carter appeals the District Court’s denial of his petition for a writ of 
habeas corpus.  Although Carter attempts to frame several issues for appeal, the 
Certificate of Appealability that this Court granted after the District Court denied his 
claim for habeas relief was limited to a single issue.  That issue is whether the District 
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Court erred in denying his habeas petition without a hearing on his claim that counsel 
was constitutionally ineffective for failing to object to his career offender designation at 
sentencing.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm. 
I. 
Since we write primarily for the parties, we need not recite the underlying facts or 
procedural history of this appeal.   
The Pre-Sentence Report that was completed after Carter pled guilty to possession 
with intent to distribute cocaine and cocaine base classified him as a career offender 
under § 4B1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines.  That classification was based on two 1993 
controlled substance convictions and one 1998 simple assault conviction.  However, 
Carter also had another controlled substance conviction in state court in 1999.
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Thereafter, Carter filed a motion to vacate the sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.  
The District Court denied that motion without an evidentiary hearing and this appeal 
followed.  
II. 
28 U.S.C. § 2255 requires the district court to hold an evidentiary hearing before 
ruling “unless the motion and files and records of the case show conclusively that the 
movant is not entitled to relief.”  Government of the Virgin Islands v. Forte, 865 F.2d 59, 
62 (3d Cir. 1989).  “In considering a motion to vacate a defendant’s sentence, the court 
must accept the truth of the movant’s factual allegations unless they are clearly frivolous 
                                              
1
 Although, the 1999 conviction was subsequently vacated by the Pennsylvania Superior 
Court, it was eventually reinstated.  
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on the basis of the existing record.”  United States v. Lilly, 536 F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 
2008) (alteration omitted) (quotation marks and citation omitted). 
 Carter’s claim for habeas relief arises from the District Court’s conclusion that he 
should be sentenced as a career offender.  
A defendant is a career offender if (1) the defendant was at 
least eighteen years old at the time the defendant committed the 
instant offense of conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction is 
a felony that is either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense; and (3) the defendant has at least two prior felony 
convictions of either a crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense.   
 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  When applying § 4B1.1, two prior convictions must be “counted 
separately under the provisions of §4A1.1(a), (b), or (c).”  Id. § 4B1.2(c)(2).  “Prior 
sentences always are counted separately if the sentences were imposed for offenses that 
were separated by an intervening arrest (i.e., the defendant is arrested for the first offense 
prior to committing the second offense).”  Id. § 4A1.2(a)(2).   
 Carter claims that the record does not indicate whether he committed his second 
offense before or after he was arrested for his initial offense.  His second conviction in 
1993 was for delivering cocaine to a minor.  Carter argues that the record does not 
indicate when he delivered the cocaine to the minor and that he could have delivered the 
cocaine to the minor prior to his first arrest, which occurred in July of 1992.   
However, the record clearly indicates that Carter delivered the cocaine to the 
minor on October, 10, 1992, the same day the minor sold the cocaine to an undercover 
officer, i.e., October 10, 1992, after his first arrest.  PSR 31  Moreover, as noted by the 
District Court, Carter had a third controlled substance conviction in 1999, which also 
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qualifies as a predicate conviction for his career offender designation.  Thus, even if the 
two 1993 convictions counted as one conviction for purposes of § 4B1.1, Carter’s career 
offender designation still would have been proper.  Accordingly, the District Court did 
not need to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine the merit of Carter’s habeas petition.  
III. 
For the reasons stated above, Carter’s counsel was not ineffective in failing to 
object to the career offender designation, and the District Court did not abuse its 
discretion in denying Carter’s § 2255 motion without an evidentiary hearing.  We shall 
affirm the Order of the District Court.   
 
